Paper · 2026-10-01 · cs.CR, cs.AI
PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
Mediates every tool call just before it runs. Path confinement cuts represented influence paths from untrusted or protected sources to unsafe effects; capability and effect checks test each effect against the authenticated request. Author-reported: wins outright in 62 of 79 eligible columns over eight agent-security benchmarks, with at most three points of utility loss.
Prompt injectionTool useLLM agentagent-securitytool-useprompt-injection
AI-compiled by claude-haiku-5-5 on 2026-11-21, not yet reviewed by a human. Every claim cites its source; check it when a detail matters.
In plain words
Tool-using AI agents read text from many places: tool descriptions, web pages, memory, and reusable "skills". Some of that text can be written by an attacker, and it can persuade the agent to send an email or spend money that the user never asked for. Checking a skill or tool description once, before it is installed, does not settle the problem, because two versions of the same skill can look identical to a reviewer while only one of them leaks data.
PACE takes a different place to make the decision: the last step before a tool actually runs. Just before each call, it looks at two things. First, it asks whether a traced chain of data can reach a dangerous action; if so, it can cut that chain. Second, it asks whether the action is something the user's authenticated request permits; if not, the call is refused. A call the request does permit can still go through, and some calls can be repaired instead of refused.
The authors report that this lowers attack success on eight benchmarks for agents while keeping most of the agent's usefulness. These are their own measurements, and the guarantees they prove cover only the data flows the system can see.
TL;DR
PACE sits between an LLM agent's proposed tool call and its execution. It checks two things: whether a represented data-flow path from untrusted or protected data reaches an unsafe effect, and whether each effect is authorised by a capability compiled from the authenticated user request. The authors evaluate on eight agent-security benchmarks using three model families; in that setting the configuration they test has the lowest worst-group attack success in 62 of 79 eligible columns and is level with the lowest in 14. The guarantees hold only for flows and effects the schemas represent.
Problem
Tool-using agents turn generated text into side effects. Text from tool metadata, retrieved pages, memory and skills reaches the planning context and can steer the next call §1. The paper argues that an admission-time gate cannot settle this. If a safe and a leaking variant of an artifact yield the same review evidence, a sound gate must treat them the same way, so it cannot relax mediation at the affected egress site §3 [thm. 1]. The decision therefore has to be made at runtime, immediately before the tool executes, where the actual arguments, the resources the agent has already read, the user's authenticated request and an intervention point are all at hand §3.
The paper's threat model: a frozen policy M, artifacts K (skills, tool descriptions, MCP schemas), and contexts c that may contain injected text and a secret s. The defender can only act at the tool boundary; it cannot retrain M, instrument tool internals or enumerate contexts §2.1.
Method
PACE handles each mediated call in four phases §4 fig. 1:
-
Propose (§4.1). Freeze the call's arguments under a fresh attempt identifier. Look up each argument's origin in the table of live values; if it is absent, create a new data node. Wire each schema-defined argument to a fresh operation node, and the operation to a fresh terminal node carrying the unsafe-effect label. Expand the call into effect atoms through the effect schema. Compile the authenticated request into a capability that limits purpose, resource, arguments, spending, validity period and how far it can be delegated. The capability reads only the trusted request channel §4.1. A position without a schema gets no edge, and an operation the model does not cover is treated as an unknown transition §4.1.
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Cut and certify (§4.2). Two checks run over the frozen state.
- Path chain. Sources are protected data nodes (secrets, personal data, credentials, source code, protected payloads) and the untrusted frontier (everything an artifact, tool return, page or memory record supplied, closed over committed flow edges). The unsafe terminal comes from the registry's verdict on the canonical proposal. Each proposed edge gets a binding: the least-cost action that the adapter implements and the deployment declares as severing eq. 5. Bindings become capacities eq. 6, and the cut is a minimum cut from the sources to the unsafe terminal, with committed edges uncuttable. The executor receives a manifest of (edge, binding, argument position, hook) for each cut edge.
- Effect chain. Nine obligations are checked over every schema-defined call. They cover whether authority is present, whether arguments are typed correctly, control over operations and principals, confidentiality, persistence, how delegated authority narrows, spending limits, freshness with respect to request and event state, and whether the hooks are available §4.2 tab. 4.
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Enforce (§4.3). The executor installs the selected action before dispatch. Three actions suppress an effect (block, refuse, dry run), four constrain it (read-only view, argument rewrite, sanitisation, budget cap), and allow passes it through. A stale proposal, one whose execution version or policy epoch has changed, is cancelled §4.3.
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Finalize (§4.3). The outcome is stored as a tool event; that record then changes the graph, provenance map and taint state that the next proposal reads. A returned value first appears at the next step and never enters its own certificate §4.3.
Decision rule eq. 7. The certified contract (PACE-C) uses ordered rules R1 to R6. R2 and R3 are disabled there. The evaluated configuration (PACE-P), used in all experiments, adds two fast paths. R2 releases a call with low reversible impact even if AUTH or BUDGET fails. R3 releases a call only if all nine obligations pass. PACE-P's combiner can also restore a C-certified call that P blocked, or apply a declared repair to a repairable verdict, without recertifying the final call §4.2 §5.1.
# Mediate one proposed tool call before dispatch [§4.1] [§4.2]
# Input: call, graph (committed + proposed edges), capabilities, registry
# Output: REFUSE, ALLOW, or a manifest of cut edges with actions
def mediate(call, graph, capabilities, registry):
# Freeze the call and attach a provenance node to each argument [§4.1]
snapshot = freeze(call)
arg_nodes = match_or_mint_nodes(snapshot.args, provenance_map)
# Wire argument -> operation -> terminal for the proposed call [§4.1]
op_node = new_operation_node(snapshot)
terminal = new_terminal_node(snapshot)
proposed_edges = wire(arg_nodes, op_node, terminal)
# Expand schema effects into atoms; read the authority [§4.1]
atoms = expand_effects(snapshot, effect_schema)
# Sources: protected nodes P and the untrusted frontier B [§4.2]
protected = protected_sources(graph) + derivation_matches(snapshot)
frontier = close_untrusted_over_committed_edges(graph)
# Unsafe terminal from the registry verdict on the proposal [§4.2]
unsafe_terminal = terminal if registry.unsafe(snapshot) else None
# Binding: least-cost action the adapter implements and deployment
# declares severing; None if the intersection is empty [eq. 5]
bindings = {}
for edge in proposed_edges:
bindings[edge] = least_cost_severing_action(edge, registry)
# Capacities: finite only for proposed, bound edges [eq. 6]
capacity = {}
for edge in flow_edges(graph, proposed_edges):
if edge in proposed_edges and bindings[edge] is not None:
capacity[edge] = cost(bindings[edge], edge)
else:
capacity[edge] = INFINITY
# Canonical minimum cut from sources to the unsafe terminal [§4.2]
cut = min_cut(frontier + protected, unsafe_terminal, capacity)
# Ordered rules; R2 and R3 are PACE-P fast paths only [eq. 7]
if schema_undefined(snapshot):
return REFUSE # R1
if low_impact_reversible(snapshot):
return ALLOW # R2, PACE-P only
if authorized(atoms, capabilities) and not influenced(protected):
if all_nine_obligations_pass(atoms):
return ALLOW # R3, PACE-P only
if not all_nine_obligations_pass(atoms):
return REFUSE # R4
if cut is None or not admissible(cut, bindings):
return REFUSE # R5
manifest = build_manifest(cut, bindings)
if manifest.nonblocking:
rewritten = apply_rewrites(snapshot, manifest)
if not all_nine_obligations_pass(expand_effects(rewritten)):
return REFUSE # R6
return manifestThe paper's exposition uses "wired", "covered" and "emitted" for the graph-construction steps; the pseudocode above keeps the same order §4.1 app. C.2.
Hyperparameters
Most "values" in the paper are configuration choices, not training hyperparameters; the paper has no trained model. Each row below is taken from the paper unless marked otherwise.
| Name | Value | Where | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target models | Qwen-3.8-27B (local, vLLM); DeepSeek-V4-Flash; gpt-5.6-luna | tab. 4 | three frozen target families |
| Decoding | temperature 0; max completion 1024 tokens | tab. 4 §5.1 | |
| Ablation seed | 20260828 | tab. 4 | single deterministic paired run |
| Concurrency | 8 workers | tab. 4 | throughput only |
| Technical-failure ceiling | 5% per reported cell | tab. 4 app. E.4 | cells above it are removed from the primary table |
| Effect obligations | nine checks in fixed order | tab. 4 §4.2 | |
| Cut solver | max-flow / min-cut on the flow subgraph of the active graph | tab. 4 §4.2 | canonical tie-breaking: cheapest, then lexicographically least |
| Cut edge costs | strictly positive rationals, fixed denominator, scaled to integers | app. C.2 | the actual cost values per action are not stated |
| Derivation transforms Ψ | raw, case, whitespace, base64, base64url, hex, percent, common digests, fixed-length prefixes | app. C.6 | paraphrase, translation and short fragments are not covered |
| Adaptive search seed | 20260922 | app. E.2 | 10 pairs each from Slack, Travel and Workspace |
| Adaptive mutator | Qwen/Qwen-3.8-27B-FP8 at temperature 1.0 | app. E.2 | shown six earlier candidates, chosen from the highest-scoring eight and the newest four |
| Adaptive payloads per round | four new payloads | app. E.2 | |
| Adaptive budget | stop at first success or 50 episodes per pair | app. E.2 | |
| Judge model | not stated | §5.1 app. E.4 | the judge is frozen; a judge from the target's own family is never the sole judge; the paper does not name the judge model, though its manifest records it |
| Budget, freshness and AUTH thresholds | not stated | — | the schema values per benchmark are described as frozen but not listed |
| Sev and Impl declarations per adapter | not stated | app. C.5 | the warrants are described; the per-adapter list is not published in the paper |
| Repetitions | 1 (ablation: one seed) | app. E.4 | no multi-seed stability claim |
Results
Author-reported. Setup: eight executable agent-security benchmarks (AgentDojo, AgentDyn, WASP, InjecAgent, ASB, PASB, MCPTox, MSB) with three target-model families (Qwen, DeepSeek, ChatGPT as labelled in the table, i.e. gpt-5.6-luna). Each cell shows the strongest attack for the given benchmark and model. Each benchmark's native score appears as Util.; larger is better, apart from MCPTox, where the figure is a refusal rate tab. 1 §5.2 app. E.2. The paper says that within benchmarks the comparison is per worst eligible group; all group-level numbers are in app. F.1 and are not reproduced here.
Headline counts (author-reported) §5.2: among 79 eligible per-group ASR columns, PACE-P is lowest outright in 62, ties for lowest in 14, and is higher in three. Left out of the count: a derived InjecAgent data-stealing aggregate, three conditional DS-S2 columns, plus two whose baseline is zero.
Main results tab. 1:
| Benchmark / method | Qwen ASR ↓ | Qwen Util ↑ | DeepSeek ASR ↓ | DeepSeek Util ↑ | ChatGPT ASR ↓ | ChatGPT Util ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AgentDojo | ||||||
| Baseline | 48.0 | 62.59 | 99.84 | 75.68 | 100.0 | 73.77 |
| CaMel | 0.32 | 35.14 | 28.14 | 60.04 | 36.09 | 57.02 |
| DTA | 0.95 | 29.84 | 33.33 | 54.0 | 55.01 | 56.01 |
| DataSent. | 35.29 | 73.77 | 78.06 | 85.0 | 84.1 | 82.95 |
| PACE | 0.0 | 59.67 | 5.09 | 75.25 | 8.11 | 72.05 |
| AgentDyn | ||||||
| Baseline | 32.5 | 63.39 | 19.5 | 65.0 | 19.5 | 74.82 |
| Repeat Prompt | 34.5 | 61.25 | 31.5 | 61.43 | 31.5 | 70.54 |
| CaMel | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.5 | 3.75 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| DRIFT | 0.56 | 29.82 | 2.78 | 13.39 | 4.5 | 14.64 |
| PACE | 0.0 | 60.54 | 0.06 | 63.57 | 0.0 | 73.57 |
| ASB | ||||||
| Baseline | 88.5 | 30.29 | 74.08 | 64.0 | 81.08 | 80.25 |
| Sandwich | 88.5 | 32.5 | 81.83 | 69.07 | 71.21 | 87.86 |
| Direct Para. | 71.5 | 62.0 | 79.0 | 81.64 | 81.75 | 81.57 |
| PoT Shuffle | 99.0 | 28.57 | 65.42 | 57.43 | 59.25 | 67.04 |
| PACE | 0.42 | 29.57 | 10.5 | 64.64 | 8.75 | 81.63 |
| WASP | ||||||
| Baseline | 19.05 | 78.57 | 9.52 | 79.76 | 4.76 | 86.9 |
| Prompt Filter | 14.29 | 82.14 | 7.14 | 75.0 | 11.9 | 83.33 |
| Simple Static | 20.37 | 72.64 | 16.67 | 64.29 | 19.04 | 84.52 |
| FIDES | 40.48 | 0.0 | 30.95 | 32.14 | 23.81 | 59.52 |
| PACE | 7.14 | 92.86 | 0.0 | 91.67 | 0.0 | 95.24 |
| InjecAgent-E (no util.) | ||||||
| Baseline | 79.07 | — | 52.29 | — | 50.5 | — |
| Sandwich | 0.59 | — | 50.62 | — | 73.12 | — |
| Instr. Prevention | 58.82 | — | 67.29 | — | 56.63 | — |
| PI-Det. | 20.0 | — | 56.08 | — | 57.36 | — |
| PACE | 0.0 | — | 3.12 | — | 30.77 | — |
| MCPTox (Util: refusal ↓) | ||||||
| Baseline | 32.52 | 0.16 | 56.54 | 0.42 | 86.93 | 27.96 |
| Allowlist | 0.72 | 2.46 | 15.18 | 7.66 | 16.29 | 55.78 |
| MCIP | 0.51 | 54.23 | 9.95 | 76.72 | 10.04 | 81.22 |
| Progent | 8.8 | 45.88 | 20.42 | 66.85 | 46.4 | 78.43 |
| PACE | 0.0 | 1.97 | 2.62 | 0.58 | 2.65 | 28.55 |
| PASB (IPI util.) | ||||||
| Baseline | 85.0 | 98.47 | 92.5 | 99.24 | 97.5 | 100.0 |
| Delimiters | 45.0 | 99.23 | 55.0 | 98.47 | 35.0 | 99.24 |
| Instr. Prevention | 17.5 | 97.67 | 27.5 | 96.95 | 27.5 | 98.47 |
| Progent | 80.0 | 100.0 | 77.5 | 100.0 | 62.5 | 98.47 |
| PACE | 0.0 | 97.69 | 5.0 | 99.24 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| MSB (Util: PUA) | ||||||
| Baseline | 38.75 | 46.34 | 100.0 | 91.24 | 98.75 | 89.08 |
| MCIP | 50.0 | 59.15 | 77.5 | 96.55 | 76.25 | 92.34 |
| PI-Guard | 37.5 | 56.42 | 57.5 | 91.98 | 66.25 | 89.97 |
| Tool Filter | 30.81 | 47.34 | 59.35 | 93.65 | 52.5 | 91.04 |
| PACE | 2.5 | 60.14 | 3.75 | 98.83 | 3.75 | 94.87 |
Other headline statements §5.2: on AgentDojo, PACE beats CaMeL, MELON and Progent on both worst-group attack success and utility, for each of the three models. Full-benchmark utility drops by at most 2.92 points against the undefended agent. On WASP, utility is 14.29, 11.91 and 8.34 points higher than undefended on the three models. MCPTox refusal moves by no more than 1.81 points.
Adaptive search §5.2 app. F.2. On 30 out-of-authority AgentDojo pairs (10 each from Slack, Travel and Workspace; Banking excluded), the undefended agent is attacked successfully 21 times (70.0%; 95% Wilson interval [52.1, 83.3]%), with nine first successes from search-generated payloads. PACE-P gives 0/30 (Wilson interval [0, 11.4]%) after 1500 episodes. All 157 out-of-authority target calls reaching the boundary were stopped before dispatch, and none used R2. This is a reduced-scale experiment on one model with a 50-episode budget per case.
Ablation tab. 2 §5.3. Complete 2×2×2 factorial on 1167 frozen cases, one seed. The three switches are: P, the cut of influence paths; C, the effect and authority checks; and B, the adaptation at the execution boundary. A0 is the wrapper-matched no-defence arm; A7 is the complete PACE-P, re-aggregated on the same cases. The table reports attack success (lower is better) and native utility or refusal (in %):
| Row | A0 | A1 | A2 | A3 | A4 | A5 | A6 | A7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Switch P (cut of paths) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
| Switch C (effect checks) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
| Switch B (boundary adaptation) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
| WASP, plain text ASR | 8.3 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 0.0 |
| WASP, URL injection ASR | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 |
| AgentDojo overall ASR | 37.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| InjecAgent-Base valid ASR | 14.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| InjecAgent-Enhanced valid ASR | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| ASB overall ASR | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| AgentDyn overall ASR | 25.0 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 23.3 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PASB overall ASR | 41.4 | 31.0 | 0.0 | 41.4 | 0.0 | 39.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| MCPTox valid ASR | 5.2 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 5.4 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| MSB official macro ASR | 24.8 | 7.1 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| WASP utility ↑ | 83.3 | 83.3 | 83.3 | 95.8 | 79.2 | 66.7 | 87.5 | 83.3 |
| AgentDojo utility ↑ | 76.8 | 13.6 | 64.6 | 76.8 | 65.2 | 13.6 | 66.2 | 67.2 |
| AgentDyn utility ↑ | 66.7 | 0.0 | 36.7 | 66.7 | 36.7 | 0.0 | 31.7 | 33.3 |
| ASB utility ↑ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 30.0 |
| ASB refusal ↓ | 39.3 | 41.8 | 38.6 | 39.6 | 37.1 | 43.2 | 41.8 | 40.7 |
| PASB IPI utility ↑ | 100.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| MCPTox refusal ↓ | 42.2 | 78.4 | 99.3 | 0.8 | 98.5 | 46.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 |
| MSB PUA ↑ | 48.3 | 52.5 | 55.8 | 58.2 | 56.6 | 54.6 | 59.0 | 62.0 |
| MSB NRP ↑ | 36.3 | 48.8 | 53.3 | 58.2 | 53.3 | 54.6 | 59.0 | 62.0 |
The paper's ablation is one deterministic paired run; differences are reported on that population and the paper makes no statistical-significance claim for component effects app. E.4.
Paper vs code
No official code. The reproducibility statement says that anonymised code
and a fixed manifest are supplied with the submission app. E.6
and contains no public repository link in its text, abstract or metadata. The
search for a public repository was: (1) links in the paper, abstract and arXiv
metadata: none; (2) project page: none linked; (3) GitHub repository search via
the API for "PACE provenance capability enforcement LLM agents" returned 0 results,
and for "provenance-aware capability enforcement" returned one repository
owned by an account that is not an author, which was excluded. A general web
search was not available in this run, so the search is incomplete. No code,
code_commit or code_license is recorded.
Internal inconsistencies in the paper, to check when reading it:
- Comparator set. §5.1 and app. E.5 say DTA is excluded from main-table comparator selection, yet tab. 1 lists DTA as a comparator in the AgentDojo block and its caption describes the three strongest "published defenses". Treat the DTA rows as diagnostic.
- Utility bound on the subset. The text says full-benchmark utility drops by at most three points §5.3. On the paired ablation subset, AgentDyn utility falls from 66.7% (A0) to 33.3% (A7) tab. 2; the paper states that the three-point utility bound fails on this subset.
- MSB-Call ranges in the ablation text. §5.3 cites 53.8% to 61.5% MSB-Call attack success without B. Table 2 reports MSB official-macro ASR only, so this range cannot be checked from the printed table.
Pitfalls
- Guarantees are conditional. Certificate soundness, authorised-effect soundness and the conditional grounded-execution theorem hold only for the represented flows and effects in the schema, and only when the stated semantic premises hold. Those premises are how requests become capabilities, how effects are labelled, the validators, the source labels, and the severance contracts §4.4 app. C.6. The paper says none of these is checked automatically, and the paper's own verifier shares the builder's graph-fold and label code, so the two cannot catch shared omissions app. C.6.
- Not noninterference. Refusal itself is an observable channel, and no bound of the form in the noninterference criterion is proved at any delta §4.4.
- Restoration can break separation. Restoring a blocked call removes neither the cut nor the terminal, so separation is lost when the set A* is non-empty, even if C authorises the call §4.4. The per-episode invariant is claimed only for the certified contract (PACE-C), not for the evaluated PACE-P §4.4.
- R2 and R3 are PACE-P only. R2 releases a call on reversibility alone and can bypass an AUTH or BUDGET failure, and R3 requires all nine obligations. Do not port R2 into a certified implementation §4.2 app. C.6.
- Redaction is rarely licensed. A data-edge redaction counts as severing only if the adapter guarantees the replacement shares no dependence on the original's content, length or structure, and the registry asserts the call would occur whatever that argument's value. The default is that occurrence may depend on it, so a call with an argument edge and no severing action pushes the cut to the terminal, where the only action is blocking app. C.5. In the evaluation, most sites are blocked rather than edited, and no nonterminal rewrite executes on AgentDyn §5.3 app. F.2.
- Taint matching is approximate. The derivation check matches registered values under the listed re-encodings only. Short, low-entropy values match benign text and inflate the protected set, and R3 inherits that behaviour app. C.6.
- Cost surrogate. Cut costs are a per-edge surrogate, not episode utility. One block at the call level may cut several edges, yet the cost sum counts each edge separately. A cheaper conflicting cut can coexist with a costlier compatible one, and the certified contract then fails closed. The cheapest rewrite can also fail a final argument check while another declared rewrite passes app. C.6.
- Freshness is process-local. The evaluated prototype does not provide durable reservations, one-shot token spending or crash reconciliation. Those are the distributed protocol in app. C.3, which the paper says is outside the evaluated artifact.
- Verifier scope. Hidden reads or calls inside a tool, strings the model rebuilds itself, and out-of-band resource writes all fall outside the represented channels app. C.6.
- Obligations need schemas. Positions without schemas get no edge, and an undefined operation or argument is refused by R1. Benchmark-specific policies and schemas were written from public interfaces and frozen before the final runs §5.1 app. E.2.
- Judge and denominator reporting. No numerical judge-agreement analysis is reported, and judge labels were not hand-corrected app. E.4. Technical failures are reported separately; a cell above 5% is moved out of the primary table app. E.4.
- Single seed and no inferential claims. The ablation uses one seed and no multi-seed stability claim app. E.4.
- Overhead not reported. The paper records solver time, certificate-check time and graph size, but does not publish a numerical mediation-overhead summary app. E.7.
- Benchmark-dependent results. ASB utility is described as implementation-sensitive and its zero rows are not explained by the official scorer app. F.2. Two benchmarks (ASB and InjecAgent-Enhanced) are at zero attack success even without defence, so they cannot show a security gain app. E.3.
- Adaptive evaluation is small. 30 pairs, one model, three suites, and a checkpoint-based mutator. Stronger mutators and attacks on parsing or on unrepresented transformations are untested app. F.2.
Lineage
- Builds on: proof-carrying code [necula1997, sekar2003] for the certificate idea; dynamic taint tracking (TaintDroid, LibDFT) as the contrast the paper argues against §4.1 §1; min-cut and Ford-Fulkerson for the cut §4.2.
- Compared against (main table): CaMeL, FIDES, DRIFT, Progent, MCIP Guardian, ToolShield, MELON, DataSentinel, PIGuard, PromptGuard-2, spotlighting, Tool Filter, MCPTox allowlist, and prompt-level defences (delimiters, sandwich, instructional prevention, paraphrase, shuffle) §5.1 app. E.5.
- Related (no card here, named only): information-flow control systems and agent-security benchmarks cited in §1 app. B.
- Superseded by: not known.
Source and license
Adapted from “PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents” by Fengpeng Li, Qizhou Wang, Yuke Hu, Kemou Li, Jun Liu, Haiwei Wu, Jiantao Zhou, Di Wang (arXiv:2610.01349), used under CC BY 4.0. Changes: condensed and restructured for implementation, with tables, equations and algorithms taken from the paper and its code, each cited to its source. Not affiliated with or endorsed by the authors.