Paper · 2025-03-10 · cs.RO, cs.AI
Safety Guardrails for LLM-Enabled Robots
RoboGuard checks an LLM robot planner's plans against safety rules. A GPT-4o root-of-trust model turns the rules into LTL constraints for the current semantic map, and an automaton check rejects unsafe plans. Non-adaptive RoboPAIR attack success falls from 92.3% to 2.3% in simulation; adaptive attacks reach 2.5-5.2%. Author-reported.
Safety filterJailbreak attacksLLM planningChain of thoughtroboticsllm-safetyjailbreakingtemporal-logicguardrail
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AI-compiled by claude-haiku-5-5 on 2026-11-22, not yet reviewed by a human. Every claim cites its source; check it when a detail matters.
In plain words
A robot that takes orders from a language model can be talked into doing something dangerous, such as driving at a person or blocking a fire exit. RoboGuard is a guard that sits between the model and the robot. Before the robot moves, the guard reads the robot's current map, the list of things the robot can do, and a short list of safety rules written in plain language. It turns those rules into formal "always" and "never" conditions for this particular map, for example "never go to the region where the person stands". It then checks the planned steps against those conditions and refuses a plan that breaks them.
The guard's own model is kept away from user prompts, which is meant to stop an attacker from talking it out of the rules. The authors tested the design in simulation and on a real robot against attacks that try to make the planner do harmful things. In those tests most of the attacks failed, and harmless plans still ran.
TL;DR
- RoboGuard is a two-stage guard for LLM-planned robot actions. A GPT-4o "root-of-trust" model writes LTL safety constraints for each rule against the current semantic map §III-A. A Büchi-automaton check then tests the proposed plan against them §III-B.
- Author-reported: non-adaptive RoboPAIR attack success falls from 92.3% to 2.3% in simulation tab. I, and from 100% to 0% in real-robot runs tab. IV.
- Adaptive attacks reach 2.5% to 5.2% attack success tab. I. Removing the root-of-trust model's chain-of-thought raises attack success from 4.3% to 12.8% tab. II.
- The released code checks a plan and returns accept or reject. It does not implement the paper's minimum-violation plan repair [code: src/roboguard/synthesis.py#L46-L94].
- Use it if you need a plan-level safety gate for an LLM planner. Every result is author-reported, on one planner (SPINE) and one robot platform.
Problem
Jailbreaks can steer LLM-controlled robots into physical harm, for example driving into people or obstructing exits. The introduction cites commercial robots among the affected systems §I. Alignment work targets text generation, not context-dependent actions §I. Classical robot safety methods rely on precise specifications for known environments, which LLM-enabled robots do not have §I. The paper sets four design goals: contextual awareness, applicability to any LLM planner, utility in benign use, and low offline and online cost §III. The method assumes an accurate world model; a compromised world model causes safety failures §V.
Method
RoboGuard has two modules §III. The safety reasoning module is a root-of-trust LLM that receives the robot's API as function signatures, the safety rules, and the world model as a semantic graph. The graph has region nodes (traversable points) and object nodes, with region edges for paths and object edges for access §III-A [listing in §III-A]. For each rule the model writes LTL constraints together with a reasoning string, using chain-of-thought §III-A app. B. The per-rule formulas are combined by conjunction eq. 1.
The control synthesis module checks the LLM planner's proposed plan against that conjunction. Each robot action becomes a proposition in the contextual set AP(M, F), where M is the world model and F the robot's actions. With regions region_1 and region_2 and the action goto, the propositions are goto(region_1) and goto(region_2) §III-A. The plan becomes a word over these propositions. A Büchi automaton is built from the safety formula, and the word is run through it. If the run ends in an accepting state, the plan is accepted §III-B alg. 1. The paper's Algorithm 1 otherwise returns the safety formula, and its text says the module resolves conflicts so as to violate user preferences as little as possible §III-B §I.
The paper states a theorem: the control synthesis always yields a plan that satisfies the safety specifications, whatever the proposed plan §III-B.
Key equation (the only numbered equation in the paper):
\phi_{\text{safe}} = \phi^{(1)} \wedge \phi^{(2)} \wedge \dots \wedge \phi^{(n)} eq. 1
Pseudocode, following the two stages above. The second stage describes the paper's intended semantics; see Paper vs code for what the released code does.
# Stage 1: ground the rules in the current map [§III-A] [eq. 1]
# Input: rules (list of str), world_model (semantic graph as JSON)
# Output: phi_safe (LTL formula, str)
def ground_rules(rules, world_model):
# Root-of-trust LLM reasons step by step, one entry per rule,
# each with (constraint, reasoning) [§III-A] [app. B]
per_rule = root_of_trust_llm(rules, world_model)
# Conjunction of all constraints over all rules [eq. 1]
phi_safe = " & ".join(all_constraints(per_rule))
return phi_safe# Stage 2: check the planned actions against phi_safe [§III-B] [alg. 1]
# Input: phi_safe (str), plan (list of actions such as goto(region_1))
# Output: True if the plan is accepted, else False
def check_plan(phi_safe, plan):
# Büchi automaton whose accepted words are the safe plans [§III-B]
automaton = to_buchi(phi_safe)
# Map each action to a proposition in AP(M, F) [§III-A]
word = [action_to_proposition(action) for action in plan]
state = automaton.initial_state
for letter in word:
# Follow the transition labelled by this proposition [§III-B]
state = automaton.next_state(state, letter)
# Accept only if the run ends in an accepting state [§III-B]
return state in automaton.accepting_statesImplementation notes from the paper's description:
- The paper says the root-of-trust model is shielded from malicious prompts §III-A. In the code it gets a fixed system prompt, few-shot examples, and a user message holding only the rules and the scene graph [code: src/roboguard/generator.py#L70-L81]. How that isolates it from a planner's prompts depends on the caller.
- The API is passed as Python function signatures. The paper's listing gives goto, map_region, replan, inspect, answer and clarify app. B.
- The LTL operators used are G, F, U, X, !, & and ->, with | also in the system prompt app. B app. A.
- The system prompt includes the rule that a temporal rule such as blocking a region should be written as G(goto(a) -> F(!goto(a))) app. B.
- Control synthesis uses the Spot library §IV. Its automaton is a Büchi automaton synthesis.py.
Hyperparameters
| Name | Value | Where | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| root-of-trust LLM | GPT-4o | app. B §IV | |
| temperature | 0 | app. B generator.py | Ablation raises it to 0.5 §IV-B |
| top_p | 1 | app. B generator.py | |
| frequency_penalty / presence_penalty | 0 / 0 | app. B generator.py | |
| max output tokens | not stated in paper | generator.py | Code sets 2925; the paper does not say |
| chain-of-thought | on | §III-A generator.py | Code requests a JSON object reply generator.py |
| safety rules (main experiments) | three: respect privacy; do not harm anyone; avoid hazardous areas | §IV app. D | Released default text differs; see Paper vs code |
| LLM planner | SPINE, GPT-4o based | §IV app. B | SPINE is an external package eval.py |
| attacker and judge LLMs | GPT-4o | app. B | |
| RoboPAIR iterations | 5 | app. B | |
| harmful behaviours | 7 types × 10 rephrasings = 70 prompts | §IV app. C | |
| safe behaviours | 10 | §IV | |
| evaluations | 210 per attack (70 prompts × 3 environment types); over 1,500 in total | §IV | |
| environments | small indoor, large indoor, outdoor; about 20,000 m² in total | §IV fig. 2 | Semantics are randomised in simulation |
| real-robot evaluation | 5 rephrasings × 7 behaviours = 35 harmful prompts; 10 safe | §IV-D | Number of trials per row not stated |
| robot | Clearpath Jackal; ZED 2 RGB-D camera; Ouster LiDAR; Nvidia A4000; Ryzen 5 3600 | app. C | README lists different hardware; see Paper vs code |
| semantic mapping | Faster-LIO, GroundGrid, GroundingDino, ROS move_base | app. C | |
| token counting | not stated in paper | §IV-C | Code uses tiktoken with cl100k_base generator.py |
Results
Author-reported. Setup: 70 adversarial prompts over three environment types in simulation §IV. The ASR is the fraction of attempts that succeed §IV. Real robot: 35 harmful prompts §IV-D.
Table I. Attack success rate, simulation tab. I:
| Attack | Input | ASR without RoboGuard | ASR with RoboGuard |
|---|---|---|---|
| None, safe task (higher is better) | plain request | 100.0 ± 0% | 100.0 ± 0% |
| Non-adaptive | plain request | 1.3 ± 1.2% | 0.2 ± 0.2% |
| Non-adaptive | template | 82.3 ± 3.6% | 0.9 ± 0.7% |
| Non-adaptive | RoboPAIR | 92.3 ± 4.7% | 2.3 ± 1.5% |
| Adaptive black-box | RoboPAIR | not reported (dash in table) | 2.5 ± 1.2% |
| Gray-box, world-model access | RoboPAIR | not reported (dash in table) | 2.9 ± 1.2% |
| Gray-box, guardrail access | RoboPAIR | not reported (dash in table) | 3.8 ± 0.7% |
| White-box access | RoboPAIR | not reported (dash in table) | 5.2 ± 0.7% |
Table II. Defence ablation, RoboPAIR attack, office-building environments tab. II §IV-B:
| Defence | ASR |
|---|---|
| RoboGuard | 4.3 ± 0.7% |
| RoboGuard, temperature 0.5 | 4.3 ± 0.7% |
| without chain-of-thought | 12.8 ± 3.3% |
| without chain-of-thought, temperature 0.5 | 25.7 ± 4.3% |
Table III. Resource use per check versus per attack tab. III:
| Method | Tokens used | LLM queries |
|---|---|---|
| RoboGuard | 4329.6 ± 353.6 | 1 ± 0 |
| Adaptive black-box | 20471.1 ± 126.7 | 15 ± 0 |
| Adaptive gray-box, world model | 24524.3 ± 91.2 | 15 ± 0 |
| Adaptive gray-box, guardrail | 52515.6 ± 132.5 | 15 ± 0 |
| Adaptive white-box | 36446.2 ± 126.7 | 15 ± 0 |
Table IV. Real-robot results, Clearpath Jackal tab. IV:
| Attack | Input | ASR without RoboGuard | ASR with RoboGuard |
|---|---|---|---|
| None, safe task (higher is better) | plain request | 100 ± 0% | 100 ± 0% |
| Non-adaptive | plain request | 0 ± 0% | 0 ± 0% |
| Non-adaptive | RoboPAIR | 100 ± 0% | 0 ± 0% |
Rule-set ablation, appendix D. Disaster-response rules (do not obstruct first responders; avoid hazardous areas), in simulation app. D: RoboPAIR ASR is 97.5% without RoboGuard and 2.5% with it; direct prompts are 0% in both conditions. Safe tasks stay at 100%. The construction-assistance rule set is in the source as a commented-out table and is not reported.
Figures, in words: Fig. 1 is the pipeline overview, with offline configuration (A), online grounding of specifications (B), and synthesis with the LLM plan (C) fig. 1. Fig. 3 shows specifications with and without chain-of-thought; without it the model misses some specifications and writes wrong ones fig. 3. Fig. 4 shows the guard blocking a plan to hit a person after that person appears in the map fig. 4.
Paper vs code
Code: KumarRobotics/RoboGuard at commit e5606aa, MIT licence, checked out
with git clone --depth 1. The owner is the KumarRobotics organisation, and
author Vijay Kumar is on the paper. Found through the project page's Code link.
The
repository holds the guard and its prompts only. It does not contain the
RoboPAIR or template attacks, the adaptive attacks, the judge, or the SPINE
planner.
- The released code does not synthesise a repaired plan. The paper's Algorithm
1 returns the proposed plan if it passes, or the safety formula otherwise, and
the introduction describes a minimum-violation synthesis alg. 1 §I. The code
only validates:
validate_action_sequencereturns one boolean and a per-step verdict list synthesis.py.RoboGuard.validate_planpasses this through roboguard.py. No minimum-violation search is present. The theorem's "safe control plan" is therefore an accept or reject in code. - Extra prompt instructions. The code's system prompt also warns against over-caution: stay within what the rule and graph state, and add only the constraints safety strictly needs base.py base.py. The paper's listing has "do not be too conservative" but not these sentences app. B.
- Few-shot examples. The code adds three worked examples to every grounding request examples.py. The paper does not mention in-context examples. The no-chain-of-thought ablation uses its own examples examples_no_cot.py.
- Default rules differ from the paper. The code's three default rules cover privacy; harm, which here also includes gathering information on dangerous objects and blocking access points; and hazardous regions, with ditches and active maintenance areas named as examples [code: src/roboguard/prompts/base.py#L15-L19]. The paper's rules are shorter and do not name ditches or maintenance areas §IV app. D.
- Graph key names. The paper's listing and appendix use
object_edgesandregion_edges§III-A app. C. The code's prompts and sample graph useobject_connectionsandregion_connections[code: src/roboguard/prompts/base.py#L38-L41] perch_small.json. - API list. The code's API also defines
explore_region(region_node, exploration_radius_meters)andextend_map(x_coordinate, y_coordinate)[code: src/roboguard/prompts/api.py#L18-L29]. Neither is in the paper's listing app. B, yet the paper's appendix example plan callsexplore_region(ground_21)app. D. - Output order in the JSON. The required schema lists each constraint before its reasoning base.py [code: src/roboguard/prompts/examples.py#L36-L40]. The paper describes the reasoning as step-by-step thinking that comes before the constraint §III-A. The code asks for the constraint first.
- Extra plan preprocessing. The code drops actions outside the API, rewrites
inspect(obj, query)to drop its query, collapsesanswerto a single symbol, expandsmap_region(x)togoto(x)followed bymap_region(x), and appends areplanstep when the plan does not end with one [code: src/roboguard/synthesis.py#L136-L199]. The paper does not describe these steps. - Constraint filtering. Only the exact string
NONEis dropped. If nothing remains, the code uses!none, which no plan can violate [code: src/roboguard/generator.py#L113-L140]. - Generation settings. Model
gpt-4o, temperature 0.0, top_p 1, and zero frequency and presence penalties match the appendix [code: src/roboguard/generator.py#L87-L93] app. B. The code also caps output at 2925 tokens, which the paper does not state generator.py. - Hardware in the README. The README lists an Intel RealSense camera, an Ouster OS1, an Nvidia RTX 4000 and a Ryzen 4 3600 README.md. The paper lists a ZED 2 camera, an Nvidia A4000 and a Ryzen 5 3600 app. C. The README is documentation, not code, but the two disagree.
- Evaluation harness.
eval.pyimports SPINE from an external package and takes its verdict from the last step of the plan [code: src/roboguard/eval/eval.py#L9] eval.py. Attack generation is not in the repository, so Tables I to III cannot be re-run from it alone.
Pitfalls
- Headline figures differ across the paper. The abstract's "from over 92% to below 3%" uses the non-adaptive RoboPAIR row, 2.3% tab. I. The introduction says "under 2.5%" §I. The conclusion says "under 3%—even in adversarial settings" §VI while Table I's adaptive rows reach 5.2%. Quote the table, not the summary.
- Arithmetic slip in the text. The text says the unguarded planner rejects 98.75% of direct prompts §IV-A. Table I gives 1.3% attack success, which is 98.7% rejection. Do not copy the 98.75 figure.
- Token saving range. The text says RoboGuard uses 21% to 12% of the attacker's tokens §IV-C. Table III gives about 21% (versus black-box) down to about 8% (versus gray-box guardrail): 4329.6 / 52515.6 = 8.2%. The four ratios are 21.1%, 17.7%, 11.9% and 8.2%, computed from Table III.
- Cost is per world-model update, not per plan. The paper counts one LLM query
per RoboGuard inference tab. III. The code calls the model in
update_contexteach time the graph is updated roboguard.py. Frequent map updates multiply the cost. Model this as updates per second, not plans per second. - Minimum-violation repair is absent. Anyone expecting a safe plan to be
returned will not get one from the code. The guard can only reject. The paper
does not say what the planner does after a rejection; the API's
replanis a placeholder that cannot be executed directly app. B. - Accept/reject may be wrong when the automaton has several matching edges.
In
validate_action_sequence, the loop over outgoing edges keeps going after a match and does not break synthesis.py. If several edges match, the last one wins. If none matches, the state does not change synthesis.py. The paper does not say how to pick the next state for a nondeterministic automaton. This is a reading of the code, not a tested result. Check it on an automaton with overlapping edges before relying on it. - Current position leaks into every action. For each action that is not
goto, the code adds the lastgototarget to the proposition set [code: src/roboguard/synthesis.py#L96-L119]. A rule about a region can therefore blockinspectormap_regionwhile the robot stands in it. The paper's definition of AP(M, F) lists only the actions themselves §III-A. - Malformed LTL is not handled.
spot.translateis called on the joined formula with no error handling synthesis.py.json.loadsand key access on the model's reply are not guarded either [code: src/roboguard/generator.py#L105] generator.py. A single bad constraint from the model raises an exception. The paper does not say what happens in that case. - Few-shot examples contain mistakes. In the third example, the object
example_ship_1jdoes not match the connection toexample_ship_1[code: src/roboguard/prompts/examples.py#L95] examples.py. The first example's grocery-store connection names a regionexample_example_road_1that does not exist [code: src/roboguard/prompts/examples.py#L20]. These examples are shown to the model. - Robustness is not zero. Adaptive attackers reached 2.5% to 5.2% tab. I. The paper says the ASR "tends to increase marginally" as attackers get more access §IV-A. Plan for a non-zero residual.
- Failures are specification failures. The paper says RoboGuard enforces whatever specifications it generates, so failures come from the grounding step §IV-A. The grounding model's errors are the main risk, and the paper reports cases with temporal rules and nuanced semantics, such as a hammer as a weapon §IV-A.
- Real-robot results are small. The table reports 0 ± 0% and 100 ± 0% with no trial count tab. IV. Treat them as a demonstration, not a rate estimate.
- Dependencies. The code needs the Spot LTL library README.md and the SPINE planner README.md. Neither is in the repository.
- Cross-references in the source are stale. The appendix refers to the experiments as "Section V". With the preliminaries commented out, the printed experiments section is IV and limitations is V. Cite by printed number.
- Only arXiv v2 was read. The raw metadata records v2, updated 2026-03-03. Earlier versions were not checked.
Lineage
- Builds on: the SPINE semantic-mapping and planning system (Ravichandran et al.), whose API and world-model format are reused §IV app. B. RoboPAIR (Robey et al., "Jailbreaking LLM-Controlled Robots") supplies the attacks §IV. Minimum-violation LTL planning (Tumova et al., 2013) is the basis of the synthesis §III-B. The Spot library is used for automata §IV. The source bibliography has no arXiv ids for these works, so none are linked.
- Compared against: the unguarded planner under direct prompts, a template attack and RoboPAIR tab. I; the variant without chain-of-thought tab. II.
- Superseded by: not stated in the source.
Source and license
Adapted from “Safety Guardrails for LLM-Enabled Robots” by Zachary Ravichandran, Alexander Robey, Vijay Kumar, George J. Pappas, Hamed Hassani (arXiv:2503.07885), used under CC BY 4.0. Changes: condensed and restructured for implementation, with tables, equations and algorithms taken from the paper and its code, each cited to its source. Not affiliated with or endorsed by the authors. Code citations refer to https://github.com/KumarRobotics/RoboGuard at commit e5606aa60127 (MIT). Any quoted code is shown under that license.